Mortgage terminations arise because borrowers exercise options. This paper investigates the apparently irrational behavior of those borrowers who do not terminate their mortgages even when the exercise value of the option is deeply in the money.
include assumptions about discrete groupings of heterogeneous agents (Deng et al., 2000) or assumptions about mixture distributions of agents with different underlying hazards (Hall, 2000) .
In contrast, Stanton (1995 Stanton ( , 1996 and others (e.g., Richard and Roll, 1989) have specified heterogeneity among pools of mortgage securities, not individual mortgage holders. Stanton applies a mixture distribution to analyze mortgage pool prepayment risks by combining a prepayment hazard function which is homogeneous across agents with pool-specific transactions cost functions. An exogenous transactions cost function is assumed to follow a beta distribution which varies across individual mortgage pools. Of course, the restrictive functional form imposed on unobserved heterogeneous errors may not yield the most efficient estimates, and in some case may even bring bias to the estimates.
This paper presents a model of borrower behavior in the mortgage market in which some correlates of the unobserved heterogeneity of individual borrowers are observed. We use this information, together with the development of martingale transforms (Barlow and Prentice, 1988, and Therneau et al., 1990) , to develop a three-stage maximum likelihood approach (3SML) for the proportional hazard model in the presence of heterogeneity among mortgage holders. The model we develop is completely general and need not be limited by specifying a restrictive functional form or an arbitrary constellation of mass-points of unobserved heterogeneity in the population.
Significantly, the model can be used to improve the accuracy of pricing mortgage pools.
The model developed here permits spot prices to be updated continuously with the new information revealed by the behavior of borrowers from the pools. This feature may have direct application in the secondary mortgage market for the pricing of mortgage-backed securities composed of seasoned loans.
In section I below we sketch out the basic model and the estimation strategy employed.
In section II we estimate the model using a sample of individual mortgages. We compare the 3 results of this estimation procedure with those obtained from more primitive models. In section III we consider the pricing implications of these models.
I. The Model
The proportional hazard model introduced by Cox (1972) provides a framework for considering the contingent claims model empirically and for measuring the effect of financial options on the behavior of mortgage holders.
Let T p and T d be discrete random variables representing the duration of a mortgage until it is terminated by the mortgage holder in the form of prepayment or default, respectively. As noted above, a major impediment to analyzing the economic behavior of mortgage holders is the unobserved borrower-specific heterogeneity embedded in the empirical data we observe. We propose a three-stage maximum likelihood (3SML) estimator that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity when estimating a competing risks hazard model. The 3SML approach proposed here is similar to the control function approach in the discrete choice model literature (Petrin and Train, 2003) that use a control function to condition out the part of the error due to the omitted attributes correlated with the discrete choice probabilities. Following Petrin and Train, we specify a control function, ( ) j f µ , in the survivor function to condition out part of the unobserved borrower-specific heterogeneity, where µ is a vector of control variables that are correlated to the residuals of the survivor function due to the omitted attributes, are a set of control functional forms. As argued by Petrin and Train (2003) , these control functions are new covariates of the survivor function that, once estimated, can enter the survivor
The Public Securities Association (PSA) has defined a prepayment measurement standard which has been widely adopted by fixed-income securities analysts. This is a series of 360 monthly prepayment rates expressed as constant annual rates. The series begins at 0.2 percent in the first month and increases by 0.2 percent in each successive month until month 30, when the series levels out at 6 percent per year until maturity. Similarly the Bond Market Association has developed a Standard Default Assumption (SDA) that is widely used as a benchmark to measure loan default experience. The SDA series begins at 0.02 percent annual constant rate in the first month and increases by 0.02 percent in each successive month until month 30, when the series levels out at 0. 
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where pi ξ and di ξ are remaining uncontrolled errors in the prepayment and default functions, respectively.
The development of counting process theory and martingale-based residuals in survival models provides a useful instrument for estimating the control functions ( )
Following Barlow and Prentice (1988) , and Therneau et al. (1990) , the martingale residual for the ith individual is defined as ( )
xp ,
where takes a value 1 at time t if individual i has experienced the event of interest and 0 otherwise; is a censor indicator that takes value 1 if individual i has survived up to time s, and 0 otherwise; is the baseline hazard function.
The martingale residuals can be interpreted as the difference over time in the observed number between events and the expected number of events. In other words, the martingale 5 The term "martingale residuals" is motivated by the property that, if the true value of β and were used in Equation (4) 
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The unconditional probability of termination is obtained by conditioning on the errors terms, , pi di ξ ξ and then integrating over their distribution such that:
G ξ ξ is the c.d.f. of remaining uncontrolled error terms for borrower i.
The log likelihood function of the competing risks model is given by (10)
( 1 log log log log ,
The dependence of these functions on , , , , ,
µ µ , and θ has been omitted for notational simplicity.
The term
) , which appears in both equations (6) 8 where N is the sample size and ,
, are indicator variables that take the value of one if the ith loan is terminated by prepayment, default, or censoring, respectively, and zero otherwise.
II. Empirical Application
We implement this strategy using a rich sample of individual mortgage loan histories maintained by The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).
A. The Data
The database contains 1,489,372 observations on single family mortgage loans issued between 1976 and 1983 and purchased by Freddie Mac. All are fixed-rate, level-payment, fully amortized loans, most of them with thirty-year terms. The mortgage history period ends in the first quarter of 1992. For each mortgage loan, the available information includes the year and month of origination and termination (if it has been closed), indicators of prepayment or default, the purchase price of the property, the original loan amount, the initial loan-to-value ratio, the mortgage contract interest rate, the monthly principal and interest payment, the state, the region and the metropolitan area in which the property is located. For the mortgage default and prepayment model, censored observations include all matured loans as well as those loans active at the end of the period.
The analysis is confined to mortgage loans issued for owner occupancy, and includes only those loans which were either closed or still active at the first quarter of 1992. The analysis is confined to loans issued in 30 major metropolitan areas (MSAs)-a total of 446,098
observations. Loans are observed in each quarter from the quarter of origination through the quarter of termination, maturation, or through 1992:I for active loans.
and (7) is an adjustment for mortgage duration data measured in discrete rather than continuous time.
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The key variables in our analysis are those measuring the extent to which the put and call options are in the money and those reflecting the astuteness of borrowers. The current mortgage interest rate and the initial contract terms are sufficient to compute the extent to which the option is in the money. We compute a variable "Call Option" (i.e., an element of in section I) measuring the ratio of the present discounted value of the unpaid mortgage balance at the current quarterly mortgage interest rate relative to the value discounted at the contract interest rate. provides an estimate of the variance in price for each house in the sample, by metropolitan area and elapsed time since purchase (Deng, et al., 2000) .
Estimates of the mean and variance of individual house prices, together with the unpaid mortgage balance (computed from the contract terms), permit us to estimate the distribution of homeowner equity quarterly for each observation. In particular, the variable "Put Option" (i.e., an element of in section I) measures the probability that homeowner equity is negative, i.e., the probability that the put option is in the money.
The details of the calculation of these variables are reported in Deng et al. (2000) . 8 Specifically, for fixed-rate level-payment mortgage i with a mortgage note rate of r i , and the mortgage term in quarters of TM i , at each quarter k i after origination at time τ i , when the local market interest rate is , where j indexes the local region, the "Call Option" is defined as: where I j , t is the price index in metropolitan area j at time t and where As proxies for other "trigger events," we include a measure of the quarterly unemployment rate and the annual divorce rate by state (i.e., X in section I).
The correlate of unobserved heterogeneity across borrowers is computed in the following way. At each quarter since origination, we calculate whether the intrinsic value of call option is in the money (this merely indicates whether current market interest rates on new first mortgages 10 are lower than the contract interest rate). We then compute a time-varying covariate, W, for each borrower reflecting the number of quarters since origination that an in-the-money call was not exercised. A borrower who systemically passes up profitable opportunities to prepay the mortgage is more likely to be a "woodhead." Our measure, W, treats differences in "astuteness" among borrowers, in their "costs of calculation," and in their "transactions costs" as observationally equivalent.
An analogous phenomenon of underreaction and momentum trading in the asset markets has been documented in the behavioral finance literature. For example, Harrison and Stein (1999) developed a bounded rationality theory to explain underreaction in response to the news in asset trading market. They attribute the underreaction behavior to the slow diffusion of dispersed information. On the other hand, Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) , and Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) attribute the observed pervasive anomalies in the asset market to cognitive biases of agent. The cognitive theory assumes that individual agent is Bayesian optimizer who has a strong prior on self-attribution, which is updated very slowly in response to the news.
( ) the term in parentheses follows a log normal distribution. The "Put Option" variable is defined as:
2 is an estimated variance, and V is defined in footnote 5. The term is defined more precisely in Deng et al., (2000) .
While this study does not intend to provide evidence whether the "woodhead" behavior observed in the residential mortgage market is due to bounded rationality or cognitive bias, we can use the persistent patterns of anomalies related to the "woodhead" behavior to update our estimation.
We have computed the measure W at each quarter for each mortgage in the sample.
There are a total of 16,454,954 of these event histories in our sample of mortgages. [ Table I is about here.] Figure I presents the cumulative frequency of W among mortgages in these different pools. It shows again that more seasoned mortgages are associated with larger numbers of missed opportunities to exercise profitable options. For more seasoned mortgages, at the time payable events occur, borrowers are more likely to have passed up a profitable opportunity to exercise options, and they are likely to have passed up more of these opportunities.
[ Figure I is about here.] [ Table II 
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B. Competing Risks Analysis
Our competing risks analysis is based upon a five percent random sample of these mortgages-22,293 observations on mortgages in 30 MSAs. Each model includes the value of each option (and its squared value) in both risk equations. The results confirm the theoretical prediction that the value of both options is important in governing the exercise of either option.
[ Table III is about here.]
In addition to the variables measuring the value of the options, Model 1 includes state average unemployment and divorce rates as well as the initial loan-to-value ratio (LTV), in four categories. We use flexible baseline functions for the prepayment and default equations, i.e., the baseline functions are estimated non-parametrically at the same time while we estimate the parametric function of the proportional factors. 12 Thus, the row labeled "Baseline" in the table reports the average shift in the non-parametric baselines for prepayment and default functions, respectively, estimated according to equation (2).
The results confirm the importance of in-the-money options in the exercise of prepayment and default by mortgage holders. They also provide some evidence that trigger events (unfortunately measured only at the state level) are important in governing exercise. The results also suggest that LTV ratios may reveal information on attitudes towards risk; ceteris paribus, those with higher LTVs are more likely to exercise options.
Model 2 simply adds the number of missed opportunities, W, a time-varying covariate, to both prepayment and default functions in this model. This specification is analogous to those used by financial analysts in estimating prepayment rates for mortgage pools.
13 12 We also estimate these models using PSA and SDA baseline functions. These results are reported in Appendix B. Table B2 . In general, our results are robust to the functional form imposed on the baseline. 13 In some models employed by financial analysts, a variable measuring the spread between contract and current interest rates is employed, as a measure of the "burnout" of prepayment in pools of mortgages. See,
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The variable is highly significant statistically. Accounting for heterogeneity among borrowers in this way increases the magnitude of the options-related variables and improves the overall fit of the model.
Model 3 extends the model 2 by recognizing of unobserved heterogeneity. In model 3,
we allow for the possibility that there are two distinct groups of borrowers; we call them "ruthless players" and "woodheads." Each borrower belongs to one or the other group, but we do not observe directly the group to which any individual belongs. We estimate the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity and the average behavior of the two groups jointly with the competing risk functions.
The magnitude of the option values increases substantially when unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for. The magnitudes of the other variables change very little. The variable W remains highly significant, even in the model which accounts for unobserved heterogeneity by classifying borrowers into distinct groups.
There is a substantial difference between the two distinct groups estimated in model 3 in their exercise of the prepayment option. For prepayment, those in the high risk group are about 7 times riskier (e.g., 4.407 versus 0.604) than borrowers in the low risk group. This difference is highly significant. For the default option, there is no significant behavioral difference between the two groups of borrowers. For model 3, over 95 percent of all borrowers are classified into the high risk, ruthless, group.
We now exploit additional information in the estimation of this model, namely the presumed correlation between our measure of "missed opportunities," W, adjusted by the duration of the loan, and the unobserved heterogeneity among mortgage borrowers.
We begin by estimating the Cox model of competing risks of prepayment and default specified by Model (1). We then collect the martingale residuals of prepayment and default for for example, Richard and Roll (1989) and Hall (2000) . We then estimate the control function for unobserved heterogeneity by regressing the martingale transform residuals upon our measure of the "number of missed opportunities" each borrower has had up to the current quarter year and the duration of the loan, such that ε is a random error term which follows a standard normal distribution. The estimated coefficients (reported in Appendix B. Table B1 ) are highly significant in both prepayment and default functions.
Finally, we estimate the model specified in equation (5) dominates all other models based on the index. Table III 
C. Summary
III. Pricing Implications
In this section we evaluate the economic importance of this more general model in the pricing of mortgages, pools of mortgages, or mortgage-backed securities. We adopt a Monte
Carlo simulation pricing approach to estimate prices for mortgage pools. We implement this simulation using the dynamic term structure model recently proposed by Dai and Singleton 14 Schwarz's B.I.C. is defined as
where N is the sample size, L is the maximized loglikelihood of the model and m is the number of parameters in the model. The index takes into account both the statistical goodness of fit and the number of parameters estimated to achieve this particular degree of (2000). This model, a three-factor affine term structure model (ATSM), attempts explicitly to balance the requirements of precision in econometric representation of the state variables and the computational burdens of pricing and estimation. The Dai-Singleton (DS) model consists of a specific stochastic long run mean and volatility of interest rates, affine functions of risk-neutral drift factors. The basic model we use is the DS generalization of the term structure model 15 of Balduzzi, Das, Foresi and Sundaram (1996) . Appendix B. Figure B1 reports the average path of simulated interest rates over thirty years using these equations and parameters.
In our application, we simulate 3 million short rates over a thirty-year period at intervals of 10 -5 year. We then randomly sample 2,000 quarterly interest rate paths over the thirty-year period. These 2,000 randomly sampled interest rate paths are applied to the prepayment and default functions reported in Table III to compute the quarterly prepayment and default risks of the mortgage pools. Finally, the prepayment and default risk-adjusted mortgage amortization cash flows are discounted back using the individual interest rate paths. (23) of DS, using the parameters reported by DS in Table II , Column 2. 16 Model 2 is, perhaps, close to the representation of heterogeneity which may appear in models used by practitioners to price mortgage pools. See Richard and Roll (1989) for a discussion.
The simulations are reported separately for mortgage pools with coupon interest rates of 8.25 percent, 8.5 percent, and 8.75 percent. The DS interest rate term structure used in our simulation has a long run mean of 8.27 percent. 17 We assume the average initial loan-to-value ratio is eighty percent, and the unemployment rate and divorce rate are the sample average, seven percent and six percent, respectively. We use the distribution of W observed from the sample, reported in Table I W, of course, varies with duration, and a mortgage pool manager does not observe the time-varying path of W ex ante. She can observe directly, however, the distribution of W in mortgage pools with different seasoning. As reported in Table I , this distribution is skewed to the right as a mortgage pool seasons, since the remaining sample in a seasoned pool tends to be less risky in exercising the refinance option.
To produce the comparisons reported in Table IV , we first estimate the prepayment and default risks of each mortgage pool based on the parameters of Models 1 to 4, the distribution of W and the stochastic term structure simulated using the three-factor ATSM. We then compute the cash flows for each mortgage pool. Finally, we compute the equilibrium price of each pool using the 2,000 randomly sampled interest rate paths over the distribution of W. The detailed estimates are reported in the appendix. 18 As the comparison in the table shows, the pricing differences 17 The long run mean and other parameters of the interest rate term structure used in the simulation are based on estimated parameters reported by Dai and Singleton (2000) in Table II , Column 2. 18 Appendix B, Table B3 reports the means and t-statistics of differences in equilibrium prices of one million dollar mortgage pools based on the estimated prepayment and defaults implied by Model 1, Model 2, Model 3, and Model 4. The first column presents the average price differences between Model 1 and Model 4. The second column presents the mean absolute price differences between Model 2 and Model 4. The last column presents the mean absolute price differences between Model 3 and Model 4. The simulation results reported in Appendix B, Table B3 use the volatility parameter and the other parameters reported by DS. In addition, we conducted this analysis with several different assumptions about volatility. The qualitative nature of the results was not affected by changes in assumed volatility.
estimated from different models are quite large. Model 1 to Model 3 all tend to overprice the mortgages compared to the model estimated using 3SML approach. The comparison also indicates that the gain from the 3SML estimation technique is larger for more seasoned mortgage pools. For example, for a 5-year seasoned mortgage pool, the pricing differences between 3SML model and Model 3 are about one percent, while the pricing differences between 3SML and
Model 3 for a 10-year seasoned mortgage pool are over two percent.
The 3SML estimation technique provides a substantially better fit to the data, as noted above, suggesting that it is a superior technique for analyzing heterogeneity in the behavior of mortgage borrowers. In addition, however, it has substantially different pricing implications. This
suggests that the 3SML model has practical importance for the pricing and valuation of mortgages and mortgage-backed securities.
IV. Conclusion
The mortgage market is large and has grown greatly in importance. Until recently, it was estimated that the outstanding volume of mortgage related security exceeds the stock of outstanding marketable U.S. Treasury debt securities as well as the outstanding corporate debt securities.
Contingent claims theory provides a coherent framework for the analysis of the financial behavior of the economic actors who hold these outstanding mortgage contracts. As an empirical matter, however, mortgage holders do not behave as ruthlessly as the theory predicts. This has implications for the pricing of mortgage pools and mortgage-backed securities in addition to the well being of borrowers. 
Appendix A. Martingale Transformations
The distribution of the martingale residuals specified in section II equation (4) Table entries are the mean values of the extent to which the call-options are in the money at the time of termination, separately by mortgage pools with different seasoning. These averages are reported separately for borrowers who never passed a profitable prepayment opportunity (W=0) and for those who passed up one or two, three or four, five to eight, nine to twelve, and more than twelve profitable prepayment opportunities. W measures number of quarters that the call option has been in-the-money but the borrower has not exercised the call option. The sample consists of 446,098 mortgages. Table B1 .
Full
Second-Stage Estimates of Martingale Transform Residuals
The table reports the second-stage regressions, equations (11) and (12) Table II , Column 2 of Dai and Singleton. Interest rate paths are simulated for three volatility assumptions. The calculations in Table VI are based on a volatility of 1.5. 
